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Regret salience and accountability in the decoy effect
Terry Connolly∗ Jochen Reb† Edgar E. Kausel‡
Abstract
Two experiments examined the impact on the decoy effect of making salient the possibility of post-decision regret, a
manipulation that has been shown in several earlier studies to stimulate critical examination and improvement of decision
process. Experiment 1 (N = 62) showed that making regret salient eliminated the decoy effect in a personal preference
task. Experiment 2 (N = 242) replicated this finding for a different personal preference task and for a prediction task.
It also replicated previous findings that external accountability demands do not reduce, and may exacerbate, the decoy
effect. We interpret both effects in terms of decision justification, with different justification standards operating for
different audiences. The decoy effect, in this account, turns on accepting a weak justification, which may be seen as
adequate for an external audience or one’s own inattentive self but inadequate under the more critical review triggered by
making regret possibilities salient. Seeking justification to others (responding to accountability demands) thus maintains
or exacerbates the decoy effect; seeking justification to oneself (responding to regret salience) reduces or eliminates
it. The proposed mechanism provides a theoretical account both of the decoy effect itself and of how regret priming
provides an effective debiasing procedure for it.
Keywords: decision making, anticipated regret, decoy effect, accountability, justifiability, regret salience, regret priming.
1 Introduction
The decoy effect, also known as the asymmetrically domi-
nated alternative effect (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982) and
as the attraction effect (Mishra, Umesh & Stem, 1993; Si-
monson, 1989), is a decision error, a violation of the nor-
mative principle of regularity (Luce, 1959, 1977; Simon-
son & Tversky, 1992). Regularity prescribes that adding
a dominated alternative should have no effect on choices
among non-dominated alternatives within a given choice
set. The decoy effect directly violates this rule. In demon-
strations of the effect, two two-attribute alternatives, A
and B, are presented, one superior on Attribute 1, the
other on Attribute 2—for example, two alternative brands
of a consumer good, one superior on quality, the other on
price. Usually, attribute values are selected such that each
alternative is chosen by approximately half the subjects.
A third alternative, the “decoy”, is then introduced. If
Alternative A is the “target”, the decoy, A’, is assigned
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attribute values such that it is close to but dominated by
A, but not by B—for example, equal to A in quality but
slightly worse on price. Normatively, since the decoy, A’,
is a dominated option, it should be discarded by the de-
cision maker, and preferences between A and B should
be unchanged by its introduction. In fact, decoys do shift
preferences. Choice of the dominated (decoy) option it-
self is rare, but its introduction reliably shifts preferences
towards the dominating (target) option.
The effect appears to be robust. It has been shown for
a variety of choice domains including consumer choice
(Huber et al., 1982; Simonson, 1989; Park & Kim, 2005)
and workplace decisions (Highhouse, 1996; Tenbrunsel
& Diekmann, 2002); by a variety of methods including
hypothetical scenarios (Wedell, 1991), video vignettes
(Slaughter, Sinar, & Highhouse, 1999), and real-world
purchasing decisions (Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, &
Bottomley, 1999); and using both between-subject (Hu-
ber & Puto, 1983) and within-subject (Pan & Lehman,
1993) designs.
1.1 Explanations of the decoy effect
A number of accounts of the effect have been offered
(see Park & Kim, 2005; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000;
Wedell, 1991). Some argue that the introduction of the
decoy changes the perceived attractiveness to the deci-
sion maker of the different attribute scores, either as a re-
sult of range-frequency mechanisms (Parducci, 1995), as
Huber et al. (1982) argue, or of loss aversion (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991), an account favored by Simonson and
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Tversky (1992) and Highhouse (1996). A second possi-
bility is that the decoy changes the relative weights the
decision maker gives to the two attributes, though Pet-
tibone and Wedell (2000) find little evidence to support
this interpretation and considerable evidence against it.
A final class of explanations, and our focus in this pa-
per, are what Pettibone and Wedell (2000) refer to as
emergent-value models. These authors propose:
Emergent values are based on the processing
of configural information concerning the rela-
tionships among alternatives in a set that can
provide additional reasons to make a choice.
These additional reasons can be thought of as
emergent dimensions that arise from the de-
mands of the task or social situation. One such
emergent dimension may be the need to justify
a decision to others. For example, dominance
is an emergent value that provides a qualitative
argument for making a choice. (Pettibone &
Wedell, 2000, p. 304)
Similarly, Simonson (1989) argues that “a possible ex-
planation for the attraction effect is that it reflects the im-
pact of the added dominated alternative on the ability to
justify to oneself and to others a choice of the dominat-
ing alternative” (p. 1). Several authors (e.g., Malaviya &
Sivakumar, 2002; Park & Kim, 2005) have explored jus-
tification and decoy effects in consumer choice, and Col-
man, Pulford, and Bolger (2007) examine related issues
in the context of strategic games. All these justifiability
accounts basically imagine the decision maker as indif-
ferent between A and B, or having difficulty in making
(or perhaps in articulating) the tradeoffs that would lead
to a clear preference, but choosing the targeted option on
the grounds that it is, at least, a clear winner (over the
decoy) while the non-targeted option is not.
1.2 Influence of regret aversion and ac-
countability on the decoy effect
We wish to examine in more detail Simonson’s (1989)
phrase, above: “to justify to oneself and to others” (p. 3,
italics added). As Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993)
argue, the search for or generation of “reasons” to justify
one’s choices may lead to decision errors and preference
reversals. For example, Shafir (1993) presented subjects
with two options, one mediocre on several attributes, the
other a mix of very positive and very negative attribute
scores. He found that the latter option was both rejected
more frequently by subjects asked to eliminate one op-
tion and chosen more frequently by those asked to select
one of the two. Apparently the availability of extreme
scores facilitates the generation of justificatory stories in
support of either selecting or rejecting the same option.
But do the same arguments serve to justify one’s choices
to both internal and external audiences? Is it possible that
at least some of these “reasons” are merely “shallow but
nice-sounding rationales” (Simonson, 1989, p. 170) that
might serve to convince an uncritical external audience
but not one’s thoughtful self? In short, are justificatory
arguments held to the same standards when addressed to
internal and external audiences?
Tetlock and colleagues (1985, 2002; Lerner & Tetlock,
1999) have explored extensively the effects on choice be-
havior and cognitive biases of expecting to have to jus-
tify one’s choices to an external audience. A very ex-
tensive review of work in this “accountability paradigm”
concludes that the relationship between cognitive biases
and accountability is complex, but that “. . . account-
ability has no effect on biases that are exclusively at-
tributable to lack of knowledge regarding formal deci-
sion rules” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 264), a category
that might well include the rule of irrelevance of domi-
nated options. Indeed Lerner and Tetlock note that ac-
countability demands can amplify bias. Simonson (1989)
found an increased decoy effect when external account-
ability was required. Slaughter, Bagger, and Li (2006)
found a decoy effect only when external accountability
was expected. Such demonstrations, however, leave it
unclear whether accountability alters “fundamental cog-
nitive processes such as how people perceive, encode, and
retrieve information” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 266).
A separate body of research addressing justification in
decision making has emerged in work on decision-related
regret (see Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002, for a theoreti-
cal synthesis). Initial studies in this area suggested that
greater regret is expected when a poor decision outcome
results from taking action rather than from inaction. For
example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found that a fi-
nancial loss resulting from changing an investment was
expected to be more regrettable than an equivalent loss re-
sulting from holding on to an existing investment. How-
ever, subsequent research suggested that the key issue
was not action versus inaction, but whether or not the ac-
tion or inaction was justified. Thus Zeelenberg, Van den
Boss, Van Dijk, and Pieters (2002) showed that a soccer
coach who changed his team (i.e., took action) and then
lost the next game would be expected to feel less regret
if the team had previously been doing poorly (justifying
the change) than if it had not (making the change unjus-
tified). Similarly, Seta, McElroy, and Seta (2001) repli-
cated Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) action effect for
ordinary investors, but found that regret expectations re-
versed if the investors were portrayed as adventurous, en-
trepreneurial business types who, presumably, would find
inaction hard to justify to themselves. Inman and Zeelen-
berg (2002) showed that consumers’ regret over unfortu-
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nate purchase decisions was driven not by whether or not
they switched products (action/inaction) but by whether
or not that choice was justified (e.g., switching after a
poor product experience, or repeating after positive ex-
periences). Reb and Connolly (2010) found that moth-
ers who based their vaccination decisions for a child on
a careful decision process were expected to feel less re-
gret over a poor outcome than would mothers who made
the same choices less carefully. This result echoes an
earlier finding (Connolly & Reb, 2003) that vaccination
decisions may not be biased in favor of inaction (omis-
sion bias) but instead reflect the mother’s assessment of
the relative regrettability of a bad outcome resulting from
the vaccine (e.g., serious side-effects) and a bad outcome
resulting from the disease itself. There is thus consid-
erable evidence that unfortunate outcomes are expected
to be less regrettable when they result from well-justified
than from poorly-justified decisions.
There is also good evidence for the converse effect:
that anticipation of regrettable outcomes can motivate
people to switch to more justifiable decision processes.
Simonson (1992) found that priming thoughts of later re-
gret led decision makers to choose a reputable but expen-
sive product over a cheaper alternative of unknown brand.
Regret priming appeared to increase search for justifica-
tions for the option chosen, and brand reputation provided
the justification. Reb (2008) showed that making regret
salient led subjects to improve their decision processes by
searching for more information and thinking more care-
fully about their choices—that is, by using a more justifi-
able decision process. Reb and Connolly (2009) showed
that even quite subtle, implicit priming of regret thoughts
(using a scrambled sentence task paradigm) induced sub-
jects in a repetitive decision task to accept potentially
painful feedback on unchosen options, thereby improv-
ing their task learning and subsequent decision making.
Kugler, Connolly, and Kausel (2009) showed that regret
priming increased the frequency of individually rational
choices in a two-person economic game (trust game).
There are thus good grounds to hypothesize that the
two classes of justification needs—justification to others,
and justification to oneself—can have opposite effects on
the magnitude, and even the existence, of the decoy ef-
fect. The expectation that one is going to be evaluated
by others and held accountable for one’s decisions will
stimulate the search for plausible arguments supporting
those decisions, and arguments favoring the targeted op-
tion (for example, “The targeted option is a winner”) may
well come to mind. Having articulated the argument, sim-
ple consistency would encourage choosing that option.
This process would explain how external demands to jus-
tify one’s decisions can exacerbate the decoy effect (Si-
monson, 1989) or actually create a decoy effect that was
not found in the absence of accountability expectations
Table 1: Options and attribute values, Experiment 1.
Each subject was presented with either Choice Set 1 (Job
1, Job 2, Job 3(a), a decoy targeting Job 2) or Choice Set
2 (Job 1, Job 2, Job 3(b), a decoy targeting Job 1).
Options Work interest (0–100) Opportunity forpromotion (0–50)
Job 1 83 34
Job 2 74 43
Job 3(a) 71 43
Job 3(b) 80 34
(e.g., Slaughter et al., 2006). Internal demands for jus-
tification may have the opposite effect. Making salient
the regret one would feel for an unjustified decision may
lead subjects to invest more thought and effort in making
their choices. Janis and Mann (1977) predicted such a
regret-induced shift to a “vigilant decision process”; see
also Huber and Seiser (2001). Such vigilance might well
make clear the weakness of the rationale that “at least the
targeted option is a winner”, and suppress the decoy ef-
fect.
We report two experiments here. The first examined
whether regret salience, by stimulating subjects to use
decision processes they can justify to themselves, can
reduce the decoy effect. Because Experiment 1’s small
sample size raises concerns about the robustness of the
findings, the first purpose of Experiment 2 was to repli-
cate the findings of Experiment 1. As further contribu-
tions, Experiment 2 used two different tasks (a job choice
task and a candidate selection task) and included an ad-
ditional condition in which external accountability de-
mands were used to stimulate the use of decision pro-
cesses that can be readily justified to others.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Design, procedure, materials, and manipula-
tions
Subjects were asked to imagine that, after an extensive
job search, they had narrowed their options to three jobs.
The three jobs were described as similar in every way
except for two attributes: work interest (which they had
rated on a 0–100 scale) and promotion possibilities (rated
on 0–50 scale). Attribute values were presented in tabular
form as in Table 1.
The experimental design was a 2 (Condition: Regret-
Salient vs. Control) x 2 (Choice Set: Set 1 vs. Set 2) fully
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between-subjects factorial. Each choice set consisted of
(a) a non-targeted option, (b) a targeted option, and (c)
a decoy option, which was dominated by the targeted
option but not by the non-targeted option. Choice Set
was purely a method variable of no theoretical interest,
manipulated in order to counterbalance which primary
option was targeted by the decoy (the high-promotion
prospect job in Set 1 or the high-interest job in Set 2;
see Table 1).
We manipulated regret salience by having subjects in
the regret-salient condition (n = 39) read the following
paragraph before seeing the options and making their
choice:
As you make your decision, keep in mind that
there is no guarantee that the job you pick will
be right for you. You could find yourself in a
job you don’t like, regretting the decision you
made and wishing you had picked one of the
other jobs.
This paragraph was omitted in the control condition (n
= 23).
2.1.2 Dependent variables
The primary dependent measure was the job choice in-
dicated by the subject, coded as either the target or non-
target choice. On a separate page, subjects were asked
to imagine how they would feel if they had chosen each
of the three options and had found it to be unsatisfac-
tory. For each outcome, they indicated their agreement
with the statements “I made a justifiable decision” and
“I regret my decision” on a seven-point Likert scale (1:
Completely disagree; 7: Completely agree).
2.1.3 Subjects
Sixty-two undergraduate business students, juniors and
seniors at a large Southwestern U.S. university, partic-
ipated in exchange for course credit. They took about
10–15 minutes to complete the task.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Experimental effects on choice frequencies
There was a significant effect of regret salience on the
percentage of subjects selecting the targeted option (see
Table 2). Twenty out of 23 (87%) Control subjects chose
the targeted option, but only 24 out of 39 (61.5%) of the
Regret-Salient subjects did so, χ2 (1, N = 62) = 4.54,
Fisher’s exact test p = .04, φ2 = .07. None of the sub-
jects chose the decoy option.
The decoy effect was significant in the Control condi-
tion (i.e., the percentage of subjects choosing the targeted
option was larger than 50%), exact binomial p = .000. No
significant decoy effect was found in the Regret-Salient
condition, exact binomial p = .20.1
2.2.2 Experimental effects on decision regret and de-
cision justifiability
Similar effects were found for the measures of decision
regret and decision justifiability using repeated-measures
ANOVAs with imagined choice (target vs. non-target) as
a within-subjects factor and Choice Set as a between-
subjects factor. Asked to imagine how they would feel if
they were to choose each option and found the outcome
unsatisfactory, Control subjects judged choice of the tar-
geted option to be less regrettable than choice of the non-
targeted option, M = 3.87, 5.00 (SD = 1.96, 1.62), F(1,
21) = 8.10, p = .01, ηp2 = .28, and the also judged choice
of the targeted option to be more justifiable, M = 5.43,
4.87 (SD = 1.53, 1.29), F(1, 21) = 5.02, p = .04, ηp2 =
.19. Regret-Salient subjects, in contrast, judged targeted
and non-targeted choice options that led to unsatisfactory
outcomes as not significantly different on either decision
regret, M = 4.36. 4.31 (SD = 1.86, 1.72), F(1, 37) = .00,
p = 1.00, ηp2 = .00, or decision justifiability, M = 5.14,
5.00 (SD = 1.58, 1.43), F(1, 35) = .41, p = .53, ηp2 = .01.
Consistent with these results, an ANOVA including
Condition in addition showed a significant interaction be-
tween imagined choice and Condition on decision regret,
F(1, 58) = 7.14, p = .01, ηp2 = .11. However, this two-way
interaction was not significant for decision justifiability, F
(1, 56) = 1.22, p = .27, ηp2 = .02. Thus, even though the
pattern of results for decision justifiability was consistent
with subjects’ actual choices (a significant decoy effect in
the Control condition, but not in the Regret-Salient con-
dition), these results should be interpreted cautiously in
light of the non-significant interaction.
1There appears to be a small effect of Choice Set in Table 2, with
larger percentages of subjects choosing the targeted option in Choice
Set 1. A similar effect, though larger and in the opposite direction, is
observed in Experiment 2. Such effects appear because coding choices
in terms of the targeted option yields higher percentages for (other-
wise) popular options than for (otherwise) unpopular options. We avoid
these rather uninteresting option-popularity effects by collapsing across
choice sets in our main analyses, in part because including option as a
predictor would require more complicated logistic regression analyses
involving interaction terms throughout the article. We note, however,
that when one option is more popular than the other (collapsing over
choice sets) and the allocation of subjects to choice sets is not exactly
even, the expected percentage of subjects choosing the targeted option
under the null hypothesis of no decoy effect can differ from 50%. In the
various conditions of our experiments, this expectation was never more
than 1.4% from 50%. Because such deviations would not affect our
primary conclusions, we prefer the simpler, traditional approach that
ignores the effects of marginal frequencies.
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Table 2: Frequency of choosing targeted options by experimental conditions, Experiment 1.
Choice of target option Regret Justifiability
Target Non-target Target Non-target
n (%) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Control
Overall 20 (out of 23) (87.0%) 3.87 (1.96) 5.00 (1.62) 5.43 (1.53) 4.87 (1.29)
Choice set 1 12 (out of 13) (92.3%) 4.00 (2.00) 5.62 (1.39) 5.00 (1.78) 4.92 (1.61)
Choice set 2 8 (out of 10) (80.0%) 3.70 (2.00) 4.20 (1.62) 6.00 (.94) 4.80 (.79)
Regret-salient
Overall 24 (out of 39) (61.5%) 4.36 (1.86) 4.31 (1.72) 5.14 (1.58) 5.00 (1.43)
Choice set 1 15 (out of 22) (68.2%) 4.73 (1.70) 4.32 (1.62) 5.27 (1.28) 5.32 (1.25)
Choice set 2 9 (out of 17) (52.9%) 3.88 (2.00) 4.29 (1.90) 4.93 (1.98) 4.53 (1.60)
2.3 Discussion
Several earlier studies (e.g., Connolly & Reb, 2012; In-
man & Zeelenberg, 2002; Richard, de Vries, & van der
Pligt, 1998) have shown that priming anticipated regret
can reduce or eliminate a number of decision biases. The
results of Experiment 1 replicated and extended these
findings. Results showed a significant difference such
that the decoy effect was stronger in the Control condition
than in the Regret-Salient condition. Follow-up analyses
found that the decoy effect was significant in the Control
condition (in which 87% chose the targeted option) but
not significant in the Regret-Salient condition (in which
61.5% chose the targeted option). While these results are
suggestive, they should interpreted cautiously in light of
the relatively small sample size as well as the unusually
large percentage of subjects choosing the targeted option
in the Control condition.
For Control subjects, choosing a targeted option that
turned out badly was judged as better justified, and less
regrettable, than choosing a disappointing non-targeted
option. Regret-Salient subjects, however, judged tar-
geted and non-targeted options as equally regrettable and
equally justifiable if they were to turn out poorly. This
is consistent with our proposal that regret priming leads
subjects to examine their thought processes more care-
fully and to realize that the justification offered by the
decoy is nothing more than a “shallow but nice-sounding
rationale” (Simonson, 1989), thus reducing or eliminat-
ing its effect on choice. The findings for decision justi-
fiability, however, should be interpreted with caution, as
the two-way interaction between Condition and imagined
choice (target vs. non-target) was not statistically signifi-
cant.
Experiment 1 tentatively suggests that accountability
and regret priming manipulations may influence the de-
coy effect in opposite directions. As noted earlier, ac-
countability can exacerbate the effect (Simonson, 1989)
or even induce it (Slaughter et al., 2006). The present
study shows that regret priming might reduce or even
eliminate it. However, the tasks used in these studies dif-
fer in a number of ways, including display format, task
complexity and realism, professional relevance to sub-
jects, and incentives and rewards.
A particular concern is the nature of the task itself. In
Experiment 1, the task was to choose a job for oneself, a
personal preference task in which only the chooser will
know how well it turned out, and only he or she will reap
the rewards of making a good choice or suffer the penal-
ties of a bad one. In Slaughter et al. (2006), in contrast,
the task was to act as a manager selecting a salesperson
for a retail organization. This involves, centrally, a pre-
diction of how well each candidate will perform (and, in
fact, the subjects were told that the scenario was based on
a real-world case and that the actual later performance of
each candidate was known to the experimenters). In this
task, the quality of the subject’s decision will become ob-
jectively known and visible to others, and the chosen can-
didate’s performance affects others, with no direct impact
on the decision maker except for reputational effects. The
Experiment 1 task thus involves personal preferences and
payoffs, while the Slaughter et al. task involves public
prediction of an objectively measurable result, with con-
sequences primarily for others. It is plausible that this
latter task itself raises subjects’ concern with justifying
one’s decision to others (those affected by the candidate’s
performance), over and above any external accountability
demands imposed by the experimenter. This difference in
task demands could account for the striking difference in
findings between the two studies.
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Table 3: Options and attribute values, Experiment 2. In
the Candidate condition, each subject was given three op-
tions: Candidate A, Candidate B, and either Candidate C1
(a decoy targeting Candidate B) or Candidate C2 (a decoy
targeting Candidate A). In the Job condition, each subject
was given three options: Job A, Job B, and either Job C1







Candidate A 5 80
Candidate B 7 66
Candidate C1 7 54




Job A 5 80
Job B 7 66
Job C1 7 54
Job C2 4 80
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 explored this possibility by examining the
possible interaction among task characteristics (prefer-
ence vs. prediction) and the experimental manipulation
(regret priming vs. accountability priming) in influencing
the decoy effect. It also included more extensive manip-
ulation checks and process-related measures than did Ex-
periment 1. Our expectations were:
1. that Control subjects would show a significant de-
coy effect in both tasks, replicating numerous earlier
studies;
2. that compared to Controls, regret-primed subjects
would show a reduced decoy effect or no decoy ef-
fect in both tasks, replicating Experiment 1; and
3. that compared to Controls, accountability-primed
subjects would show no reduction in the decoy ef-
fect in either task, and a possible increase in the de-
coy effect in the candidate selection task, replicating
the findings of Slaughter et al. (2006).
Experiment 2 examined the effects of regret salience
and accountability to others on the decoy effect in two
types of task: a job choice task similar to that used in
Experiment 1, and a candidate selection task similar to
that used by Slaughter et al. (2006).
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Design, procedure, materials, and manipula-
tions
The experimental design was different from Experiment
1 in that an accountability-to-others condition was added
and two decision tasks were used: a personal preference
task, in which subjects had to select a job for themselves,
and a prediction task, in which subjects had to select
a candidate for a position in an organization. The de-
sign thus was a 3 (Condition: Control vs. Regret-Salient
vs. Accountability to Others) x 2 (Task: Job Choice vs.
Candidate Selection) x 2 (Choice Set: Set 1 vs. Set 2)
between-subjects factorial, with about 20 subjects per
cell.
The Job Choice task used essentially the same sce-
nario as Experiment 1. For the Candidate Selection task,
subjects were asked to take on the role of a Human Re-
sources consultant helping a company to select a new
plant manager. Both tasks used identical attribute ranges
and scores, taken from a candidate selection task used by
Highhouse (1996, Experiment 2). Scores for the three op-
tions were presented in a table, with the non-targeted op-
tion first, the targeted option second, and the decoy third,
to facilitate comparison of the target and decoy. Numeri-
cal values of the attribute scores for each task are shown
in Table 3. Subjects were asked to assume that the options
were similar on all other attributes.
The primary dependent measure was again the sub-
jects’ option choice, either their preferred job (Job Choice
task) or the candidate they would recommend for hiring
(Candidate Selection task). After indicating their choices,
subjects completed several post-decision process and ma-
nipulation questions, each presented on a separate com-
puter screen. These measures are described in more detail
in the Results section.
Subjects in the Accountability condition read a short-
ened version of the instructions used by Slaughter et al.
(2006). In the Accountability/Job Choice condition they
read:
After you have made your choice, you will be
asked to write a short essay explaining the de-
cision process you used. This essay will be
read and evaluated by a graduate student. Also
some of the study subjects will be contacted in
a short while to be interviewed about their deci-
sion. One purpose of this study is to assess the
strategies undergraduate business students like
you use in making job choice decisions.
In the Accountability/Candidate Selection condition,
the last phrase was replaced by “. . . in making candidate
selection decisions”. While subjects were indeed asked
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to write a short essay after making the choice, this essay
was not evaluated by a graduate student and no subject
was later interviewed.
Subjects in the Regret-Salient/Job Choice condition
read instructions similar to those of Experiment 1:
As you make your choice keep in mind that
there is no guarantee that the job you choose
will be the right one for you. You may dis-
cover later that you are not satisfied with the
job you pick, regretting the decision you made
and wishing you had picked one of the other
jobs instead.
Those in the Regret-Salient/Candidate Selection con-
dition read:
As you make your recommendation, keep in
mind that there is no guarantee that the candi-
date you choose will be the right one for the job.
You may discover later that you are not satisfied
with the candidate you chose, regretting the de-
cision you made and wishing you had picked
one of the other candidates instead.
Those in the Control condition read neither of these
paragraphs but went directly to choosing an option.
3.1.2 Subjects
Two hundred forty-two undergraduate business students
at a large Southwestern U.S. university participated in ex-
change for course credit. They completed the experimen-
tal materials in individual rooms in our computer-based
lab, taking about 10–15 minutes to do so.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Manipulation checks
Accountability. One post-decision question asked:
“While you were making this decision, did you expect to
have to explain how and why you made this response?”
Subjects in the Accountability condition were signifi-
cantly more likely to check “yes” (49%) than were those
in the Regret-Salient (24%) or Control (20%) conditions,
χ2 (2, N = 242) = 18.93, Fisher’s exact test p = .000,
φ2 =.08, with no significant difference between these lat-
ter two conditions, χ2 (1, N = 121) = 0.43, Fisher’s exact
test p = .57 φ2 = .003. In the Candidate Selection task,
48% of Accountability subjects checked “yes”, as against
22% in the Regret-Salient condition and 20% in the Con-
trol condition, χ2 (2, N =121) = 9.09, Fisher’s exact test
p = .01, φ2 = .08. In the Job Choice task, the correspond-
ing fractions were 50%, 25%, and 19%, χ2 (2, N = 121)
= 9.87, Fisher’s exact test p = .01, φ2 = .08. The Ac-
countability manipulation thus appears to have been at
least modestly successful in raising the subjects’ expec-
tations that they would be required to provide an account
of how and why they made the choices they did. (We
were initially concerned that only about half of the Ac-
countability subjects thought they would later be asked
to explain their decisions. It may be that many of them
focused on the threatened interview rather than on the
written explanation. The instructions warned only that
“some” of the subjects would be interviewed. Given the
numbers of subjects and the logistics of setting up inter-
views, many subjects may well have concluded that their
own risk of being called for interview was small. In addi-
tion to the manipulation check, however, evidence of the
adequacy of the Accountability manipulation is found in
the main analysis, where we found significant condition
effects and much longer essays for the Accountable sub-
jects than for the Control and Regret-Salient subjects.)
Regret salience. Several post-decision questions asked
the subjects to rate how much they thought about a va-
riety of issues as they were making their decision. One
question asked about the subject’s concern over “the re-
gret I might feel as a result of my decision”. A second
asked about the concern that “I might blame myself if
I made a poor decision”. Responses were on five-point
scales (anchored at 1: Not at all, and 5: A great deal).
As in earlier studies (e.g., Connolly & Reb, 2003) the
self-blame and regret measures were strongly correlated,
r(240) = .63, p = .000, so we combined them into a single
composite measure of decision regret. A two-way Con-
dition x Task ANOVA on the composite decision regret
measure showed a main effect for Condition, F(2, 236)
= 5.43, p = .01, ηp2 = .04, but no main effect for Task,
F(1, 236) = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 = .00, and no Task x Con-
dition interaction, F(2, 236) = 0.04, p = .96, ηp2 = .00.
The mean score was higher (M = 3.03, SD = 1.20) in the
Regret-Salient condition than in either the Accountability
condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.12) or the Control condition
(M = 2.58, SD = 1.16), with no significant difference be-
tween the latter two. The Regret-Salience manipulation
thus appears to have succeeded in making the possibility
of decision regret and self-blame salient to the subjects.
3.2.2 Experimental effects on choice frequencies
Frequencies and percentages of subjects choosing the
targeted option, broken down by Condition, Task, and
Choice Set, are shown in Table 4 and summarized in Fig-
ure 1. No subject in any condition chose the decoy op-
tion. Experimental condition significantly affected the
percentage of target choices, χ2 (2, N = 242) = 22.89,
Fisher’s exact test p = .000, φ2 = .10. The targeted option
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Table 4: Frequencies of choosing targeted options by experimental conditions, Experiment 2.
Control Regret salience Accountability
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Candidate condition
Overall 27 (out of 41) (65.9) 15 (out of 40) (37.5) 33 (out of 40) (82.5)
Choice set 1 9 (out of 21) (42.9) 3 (out of 21) (14.3) 13 (out of 20) (65.0)
Choice set 2 18 (out of 20) (90.0) 12 (out of 19) (63.2) 20 (out of 20) (100.0)
Job condition
Overall 29 (out of 41) (70.7) 18 (out of 40) (45.0) 28 (out of 40) (70.0)
Choice set 1 12 (out of 21) (57.1) 8 (out of 20) (40.0) 8 (out of 20) (40.0)
Choice set 2 17 (out of 20) (85.0) 10 (out of 20) (50.0) 20 (out of 20) (100.0)
Across conditions
Overall 56 (out of 82) (68.3) 33 (out of 80) (41.3) 61 (out of 80) (76.2)
Choice set 1 21 (out of 42) (50.0) 11 (out of 41) (26.8) 21 (out of 40) (52.5)
Choice set 2 35 (out of 40) (87.5) 22 (out of 39) (56.4) 40 (out of 40) (100.0)
Figure 1: Proportion of target-option choices by experi-






































was chosen significantly less often in the Regret condi-
tion (41%) than in the Control condition (68%), χ2 (1, N
= 162) = 11.96, Fisher’s exact test p = .001, φ2 = .08,
or the Accountability condition (76%), χ2 (1, N = 160) =
20.22, Fisher’s exact test p = .000, φ2 = .13. The Control
and Accountability conditions did not differ significantly
from each other overall, χ2 (1, N = 162) = 1.28, Fisher’s
exact test p = .30, φ2 = .01.
Within-condition analyses revealed a significant decoy
effect in the Control condition (i.e., the percentage of sub-
jects choosing the targeted option was larger than 50%),
exact binomial p = .001, as well as in the Accountability
condition, exact binomial p = .000. In contrast, no decoy
effect was found in the Regret-Salient condition, where
a non-significant minority (41%) chose the targeted op-
tion, exact binomial p = .15. These results suggest that
the Regret-Salience manipulation was successful in elim-
inating the substantial decoy effect found in the Control
condition for both choice tasks. The Accountability ma-
nipulation, as predicted, did not reduce the decoy effect
overall. In the Job Choice task, selection of the targeted
option was essentially unchanged by the Accountability
manipulation, (70.7% in Control, 70.0% in Accountabil-
ity condition). In the Candidate Selection task, 82.5%
of subjects in the Accountability condition chose the tar-
geted option, as against only 65.9% in the Control con-
dition, a nonsignificant difference, χ2 (1, N = 81) = 2.92,
Fisher’s exact test p = .13, φ2 = .04. This is at best a
weak replication of Slaughter et al.’s (2006) finding that
accountability exacerbated the decoy effect in a similar
task.2 However, whether the exacerbation effect in the
2Among all subjects for whom the accountability manipulation was
successful, 37 of 39 (95%) chose the targeted option. This percentage
is significantly greater than 50%, binomial p = .000, and significantly
greater than in the control condition (χ2 (1, N =121) = 10.50, Fisher’s
exact test p = .001, φ2 = .09). Although these results more clearly repli-
cate Slaughter et al.’s (2006) finding, we prefer the more conservative
approach of including all subjects in the Accountability condition.
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Figure 2: Mean scores on justification to others (left) and justification to self (right) by experimental condition, Exper-


































































Candidate Selection task is real or not, the results clearly
show that Accountability does nothing to reduce the de-
coy effect in either task. Regret Salience, in contrast,
clearly does, reducing choice of the targeted option to less
than 50% of the subjects’ choices.
3.2.3 Mediation of the experimental effect through
justification to self and justification to others
As shown in Figure 2, analyses of post-decision measures
showed that concern for justification with others was par-
ticularly high in the Accountability condition, whereas
concern for justification with self was particularly high in
the Regret-Salient condition. These two concerns were
measured as “How I could justify my choice to some-
one else” and “How I could justify my choice to myself”
(italics in original; same 1–5 scale as described above). A
two-way ANOVA (Condition x Task) showed highly sig-
nificant main effects of Condition on both measures: for
justification to others, F(2, 236) = 8.52, p = .000, ηp2 =
.07, for justification to self, F(2, 236) = 16.23, p = .000,
ηp
2 = .12. Neither measure showed any significant main
effect for Task or a Task x Condition interaction. Pairwise
t tests showed that concern with justification to others was
scored higher in the Accountability condition (M = 3.68,
SD = 1.25) than in either the Regret-Salient condition (M
= 2.94, SD = 1.26) or the Control condition (M = 2.96,
SD = 1.34) (Accountability vs. Regret-Salient: t(158) =
3.72, p = .000, Cohen’s d = .59; Accountability vs. Con-
trol: t(160) = 3.50, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .56). Concern
with justification to self was scored higher in the Regret-
Salient condition (M = 4.42, SD = .87) than in either the
Accountability condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.11) or the
Control condition (M = 3.48, SD = 1.45) (Regret-Salient
vs. Accountability: t(158) = 5.45, p = .000, Cohen’s d =
.87; Regret-Salient vs. Control: t(160) = 5.04, p = .000,
Cohen’s d = .79).
These justification concerns also predicted choice of
the targeted option (coded as 1, non-targeted option
coded as 0). A binary logistic regression showed that
concern about justification to others was associated with a
higher likelihood of choosing the targeted option, B = .37,
SE(B) = .11, Exp(B) = 1.44, Wald(1) = 11.25, p = .001,
whereas concern about justification to self was associated
with a lower likelihood of choosing the targeted option,
B = −.48, SE(B) = .13, Exp(B) = .62, Wald(1) = 14.58,
p = .000. Interestingly, the composite measure of regret
reported above under manipulation checks did not signif-
icantly predict choice of the targeted option in a separate
binary logistic regression analysis, B =−.14, SE(B) = .11,
Exp(B) = .87, Wald(1) = 1.46, p = .23. The justification
measures thus serve as more than additional manipulation
checks for the primary experimental manipulations, and
suggest that justification is a key process variable.
To further examine this possibility, we tested whether
justification mediated the difference in choices between
the Regret-Salient and Accountability conditions. Given
that we had two potential mediators (justification to self
and justification to others) and a binary dependent vari-
able (choice of target, coded as 1, vs. non-target, coded
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as 0), we followed the approach described in MacKin-
non (2000) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) to examine
multiple mediator models on binary dependent variables
using a bootstrap approach. We simultaneously entered
experimental condition (Regret-Salient vs. Accountabil-
ity), justification to self, and justification to others into a
multiple binary logistic regression.
Experimental condition (Accountability coded as 1,
Regret-Salient coded as 0) continued to predict choice,
B = 1.02, SE(B) = .39, Exp(B) = 2.77, Wald(1) = 6.91,
p = .01. Justification to self also significantly predicted
choice, with the expected negative sign, B = −.47, SE(B)
= .19, Exp(B) = .63, Wald(1) = 6.08, p = .01. Justification
to others almost significantly predicted choice, with the
expected positive sign, B = .25, SE(B) = .14, Exp(B) =
1.28, Wald(1) = 2.92, p = .09. Further, the combined in-
direct, or mediational, bootstrapped effect was .60, with a
bootstrapped and bias-corrected 95% confidence interval
of .19 to 1.17. The specific indirect effect through justifi-
cation to self was .41 (bootstrapped), with a bootstrapped
and bias-corrected 95% confidence interval of .08 to .95.
The specific indirect effect through justification to oth-
ers was .18 (bootstrapped), with a bootstrapped and bias-
corrected 95% confidence interval of −.01 to .47.
Taken together, these results suggest that concerns
about justification to self and to others partially mediated
the difference between choices in the Regret-Salient and
Accountability conditions consistent with the hypothe-
sized mechanism: The experimental manipulations in-
duced a perceived need for either internal or external jus-
tification, and these concerns in turn influenced the prob-
ability of choosing the targeted option—that is, of man-
ifesting a decoy effect. Perceived concern about internal
justification reduced this probability and perceived con-
cern about external justification increased it.
3.2.4 Analysis of written accounts of the decision
process
After choosing their preferred option, subjects were
asked to describe in their own words how they had gone
about making this decision. These written accounts were
independently coded by two raters on four items:
1. The number of words in each account.
2. Whether or not the account explicitly mentioned Op-
tion C, the decoy option.
3. Whether or not those mentioning Option C also ex-
plicitly noted that it was dominated by the target,
Option B (i.e., tied on one attribute, worse on the
other).
4. Whether or not the argument “I chose the option that
scored better on the dimension I think most impor-
tant” was explicitly made. (We attempted to code
for a number of other arguments but only this one
appeared more than a few times.)
The independent raters agreed on 96% or better of the
codes in each category. Remaining disagreements were
resolved by discussion.
To analyze description length, due to the skewed nature
of the variable, we first transformed word count by tak-
ing its natural logarithm (after adding 1, in order to avoid
word counts of 0 that have no logarithm). Condition sig-
nificantly affected this transformed variable, F(2, 239) =
26.41, p = .000, ηp2 = .12. Pairwise comparisons showed
that whereas Control (M = 2.60) and Regret-Salient (M =
2.88) account length did not significantly differ, t(160) =
1.52, p = .13, subjects in the Accountability condition (M
= 3.77) wrote much more than Control subjects, t(160) =
7.25, p = .000, or Regret-Salient subjects, t(158) = 5.61,
p = .000, either because they anticipated the account they
might be asked to give later or thought that this was the
place to provide it. These longer accounts colored other
coding scores, however: The longer an account, the more
likely it was to mention any decision-related matter.
Forty-one percent of Accountability subjects explicitly
referred to Option C, while only 20% of those in the Con-
trol condition and 21% of those in the Regret-Salient con-
dition did so, χ2 (2, N = 242) = 11.83, Fisher’s exact test
p = .004, φ2 = .05. Thirty-eight percent of Accountability
subjects noted that Option C was dominated, while only
15% of Control subjects and 14% of Regret-Salient sub-
jects did so, χ2 (2) =17.02, Fisher’s exact test p = .000,
φ2 = .07. Across all experimental conditions, subjects
who noted the dominance relationship overwhelmingly
chose the targeted option (52 of 53 = 98%), while only
98 of 189 (52%) of those not noting dominance made
that choice, χ2 (1) = 35.7, Fisher’s exact test p = .000,
φ2 = .15. Evidently subjects who explicitly noted that the
decoy, Option C, was dominated found this a compelling
argument in favor of the dominating targeted option. Dis-
proportionately more Accountability subjects noted this
dominance than did those in the other two experimental
conditions.
Finally, the argument that the chosen option was higher
on the dimension the subject judged to be more im-
portant was made by 38% of Control subjects, 54% of
Regret-Salient subjects, and 60% of Accountability sub-
jects, χ2 (2) = 8.51, Fisher’s exact test p = .02, φ2 = .04.
Pairwise comparisons showed significant differences be-
tween the Accountability and Control conditions, χ2 (1) =
7.98, Fisher’s exact test p = .007, and between the Regret-
Salient and Control conditions, χ2 (1) = 4.15, Fisher’s ex-
act test p = .06, but not between the Accountability and
Regret-Salient groups, χ2 (1) = 0.64, Fisher’s exact test
p = .52. In short, both Regret-Salient and Accountability
subjects were more likely than Controls to make the (rea-
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sonable) justification that they chose the option higher on
the more important dimension. However, while Account-
ability subjects also exceeded Controls in their use of the
(unreasonable) “Target dominates C” argument, Regret-
Salient subjects did not. Regret-Salient subjects, while
sharing with Accountability subjects a felt need to justify
their choices, were apparently more discriminating in se-
lecting appropriate arguments to do so.
This process evidence, though consistent with our the-
oretical account, is somewhat weakened by being col-
lected after the central decision had been made. This
leaves open the possibility that subjects are merely en-
gaging in retrospective sense-making, presenting coher-
ent post hoc accounts of their decision process so as to be
consistent with choices they had actually made on other
grounds (not necessarily accessible to themselves). We
judged that placing the measures earlier, before or dur-
ing the decision process, would lead subjects to be unac-
ceptably reactive, so post hoc reflections seemed the best
we could do. The ratings on self- and other-justification
and the reports of what arguments the subjects used are
thus included here as imperfect but supportive evidence
for our theoretical arguments.
3.2.5 Application of effort to the decision task
A final measure on the “what were you thinking about?”
scales asked subjects the extent to which they thought “I
should try hard to make the best decision I could” (1:
Not at all; 5: A great deal). A two-way analysis of vari-
ance over Condition and Task showed a significant effect,
F (2, 236) = 4.72, p = .02, ηp2 = .07. Pairwise com-
parisons showed Regret-Salient subjects scoring signifi-
cantly higher than Controls on this measure (M = 4.49,
4.01; SD = .83, 1.17; t (160) = 2.98, p = .003, Cohen’s d
= .47) and almost significantly above Accountability sub-
jects (M = 4.49, 4.24; SD = .83, .92; t(158) = 1.81, p =
.07, Cohen’s d = .29). The latter group did not differ sig-
nificantly from Controls (M = 4.24, 4.01; SD = .92, 1.17; t
(160) = 1.36, p =.18, Cohen’s d = .22). This measure sug-
gests that Regret-Salient subjects may have exerted more
cognitive effort in the task than did Control or Account-
ability subjects.
3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the main finding of
Experiment 1: Making salient to subjects the possibility
that their choices might lead to regrettable results elim-
inated the decoy effect. The replication included both
a modified form of the personal preference task used in
Experiment 1 and an external prediction task (selecting a
candidate for a job in an organization, where the outcome
is publically evaluated and the positive or negative con-
sequences fall mainly on others). In both tasks the decoy
effect, substantial in a control condition, was maintained
by a standard accountability manipulation involving jus-
tifying one’s choice to others (and may have actually in-
creased in the Candidate Selection task, where account-
ability demands were built into the task itself as well as
being imposed by the experimenter). Note that this ma-
nipulation did not consistently exacerbate the decoy ef-
fect, as in previous studies (e.g., Slaughter et al., 2006).
One possible explanation is that our accountability ma-
nipulation had elements of both being evaluated by oth-
ers and providing reasons, which have been shown previ-
ously to have opposing consequences for the decoy effect
(Simonson & Nowlis, 2000).
The decoy effect was eliminated (i.e., choice of the
targeted option was below, and not significantly differ-
ent from, 50%) by a regret-salience manipulation that ap-
pears to have led subjects to think about justifying their
decision to themselves. Regret salience also increased
the amount of thought subjects reported giving to their
decisions, as compared to the Control and Accountabil-
ity conditions, while reducing the use of the (fallacious)
dominance argument on which the decoy effect appears
to be largely based.
4 General discussion
The two experiments reported here suggest both practical
techniques for the management of the decoy effect and
some theoretical insight into its component mechanism.
The practical implications are straightforward (assuming,
tentatively, that the laboratory findings generalize to other
contexts and populations). Warning decision makers that
they will be asked to explain and justify their choices to
an external evaluative audience maintains or exacerbates
the decoy effect (Experiment 2; Simonson, 1989), and
may even introduce it when it does not appear sponta-
neously in a control condition (Slaughter et al., 2006).
This is consistent with Larrick’s (2004) conclusion that,
while accountability debiases a wide range of cognitive
errors, its “. . . focus on justification may have the effect
of exacerbating justification-based decision biases” such
as reason-based choice effects (Shafir et al., 1993). In
contrast, the present studies show that priming subjects
to think about the regret they might experience if their
choice turns out badly reduces or eliminates the decoy ef-
fect, for both personal preference and external prediction
tasks. Regret priming, which has been shown to reduce
or eliminate a variety of cognitive and decisional errors
(Connolly & Reb, 2012; Larrick, 2004), appears on the
present evidence to have the same ameliorative power for
the otherwise robust decoy effect.
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The theoretical account we offer for the contrasting ef-
fects of accountability and regret salience turns on the
difference between justifying one’s choices to others (as
in accountability theory; Tetlock, 1992, 2002) and justi-
fying them to oneself (a central concern of Decision Jus-
tification Theory; see Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). We
noted earlier Simonson’s (1989) plausible suggestion that
an argument that might serve to convince an external au-
dience (for example, “I picked a winner”, the targeted
option being an unambiguous “winner” over the decoy)
might be expected to serve an internal audience as well.
The evidence here suggests that this is not necessarily
the case. Our externally accountable subjects reported
directing their attention toward justifying their choice to
the audience, and did so with little additional effort, but
maintained or even increased the substantial decoy effect
found in the control condition. Regret-salient subjects,
in contrast, reported directing their thinking toward jus-
tifying their choices to themselves, and thinking harder
about their decision than did control or accountable sub-
jects. Their choices showed no evidence of the decoy
effect.
These findings appear to weaken range-frequency (Par-
ducci, 1995) and similar accounts of the decoy effect.
Such an account (e.g., Slaughter, Kausel, & Quiñones,
2011) argues that adding a decoy, A’, to a choice be-
tween options A and B both extends the apparent range
of the attribute on which A scores lower (thus making A’s
score appear less extremely low) and makes high scores
on the attribute on which A excels appear more frequent
(perhaps emphasizing B’s shortcomings on this dimen-
sion). However, in our Experiment 2, the numerical scale
scores were identical across experimental conditions, so
any possible range/frequency effects would also be con-
stant across conditions, thus offering no explanation of
the between-conditions shift from a substantial decoy ef-
fect to its complete absence. It is certainly possible that
range/frequency mechanisms may contribute to decoy ef-
fects in some circumstances, but it is difficult to see how
they can be a necessary condition for all such effects.
Loss-aversion accounts appear to face a similar difficulty.
We tentatively interpret the present studies as support-
ing an emergent-value account of the decoy effect, with
the dominance relationship between decoy and target pro-
viding the “emergent dimension that arise[s] from the de-
mands of the task or social situation” as proposed by Pet-
tibone and Wedell (2000, p. 304). Our extension of their
account is that the persuasive effect of this emergent con-
sideration can be undermined by a regret-priming manip-
ulation. The decoy is effective because it offers the deci-
sion maker an argument justifying the choice of the tar-
geted option to others (in the accountability condition)
and perhaps to one’s inattentive self (in the control con-
dition). The regret-primed decision maker, however, ex-
amines this argument more critically and finds it uncon-
vincing, and the decoy effect disappears. This account
dovetails both with the extensive earlier evidence link-
ing anticipated regret and need for justification, and with
the decision process evidence in the present experiments.
To reiterate the evidence summarized in Figure 2: Only
the subjects in the Accountability condition reported el-
evated concern about justifying their decision to others
(and showed a normal or enhanced decoy effect); only
those in the Regret-Salient condition reported elevated
concern about justifying their decision to themselves (and
showed no decoy effect). A justification mechanism ac-
counts for both groups’ behavior, but with one group
more critical than the other of the decoy argument.
Tetlock (1992, 2002) succinctly summarizes his and
others’ work on external audience effects under the
metaphor of decision makers as “intuitive politicians”,
justifying choices to an external constituency in light of
their knowledge of the audience’s preferences, the infor-
mation available, and a judgment of what will be per-
suasive. Anticipation of decision-related regret appears
to trigger a more self-critical decision maker, scrupu-
lously examining her decision process and considering
justifications that might later reduce regret and self-blame
should a decision turn out badly. Apparently an argument
such as “I picked a winner” fails such rigorous scrutiny.
The regret-primed subject thinks seriously about how she
could justify her decision to herself, and sees that the de-
coy option will not serve this purpose. Once the decoy
option is seen as irrelevant to the central decision, its ef-
fect disappears.
We noted earlier Janis and Mann’s (1977) prediction
that the anticipation of regret can encourage “vigilant
decision making”—scrupulous gathering of information,
canvassing of a range of options, consideration of conse-
quences, and the like. Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002)
proposed in their Decision Justification Theory that re-
gret avoidance is closely linked to such careful decision
processes and later studies have supported that proposal
(Kugler et al., 2009; Reb, 2008; Reb & Connolly, 2009,
2010). We see the present findings as further evidence of
the same process: When the possibility of regret is made
salient, self-justification needs can improve decision pro-
cess, though other-justification demands may not. The
regret-primed decision maker must justify her decisions
to herself, and is less easily satisfied with “shallow but
nice-sounding rationales” (Simonson, 1989, p. 170) than
is the intuitive politician, who seeks only to satisfy an ex-
ternal audience. Satisfying oneself appears to require a
higher standard of argument.
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